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DETERMINATIVE LEGAL PROVISIONS 
The following legal provisions are determinative and are set forth verbatim in 
the Addendum to the Brief of Appellants: 
Utah Constitution Art. I, § 10; 
Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-21-1 and -2; 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 38 and 39. 
(Add. 20-25.) 
COMMENT ON APPELLEES' STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Approximately three pages of Appellees' brief is dedicated to summarizing the 
trial court's determination of facts. As expected, Appellees describe the trial court's 
determination in a way that favors their defense to this appeal. To characterize the 
trial court's findings of fact, as opposed to the jury's findings of fact, as the "facts" of 
this case is misleading and begs the question presented by this case; namely, from a 
procedural and constitutional point of view, whose determination of facts should 
control, the jury's or the trial court's. For this reason, Appellants object to any 
consideration given to Appellees' statement of fact relating to the alleged violation of 
the CC&Rs. 
In addition, Appellants object to Appellees' statement of fact because Appellees' 
summary of the trial court's findings of fact is completely irrelevant to the procedural 
issue presented by this Appeal. The relevant facts are completely, yet concisely, stated 
-1-
as follows: (1) before trial both parties formally requested a trial by jury on all issues 
(R. 232-241, 415-417, 553-554, 901-902), (2) this case was tried in its entirety before a 
jury (R. 1226), (3) at the close of evidence, Appellees did not make a motion for a 
directed verdict and thereby acknowledged that there was sufficient evidence to require 
that the case, be submitted to the jury, (4) the jury was instructed on the law and, in 
particular, they were directed to find whether a breach of the CC&Rs had occurred 
and whether damages should be awarded (R. 1152-1189), (5) based on the evidence 
presented at trial, the jury concluded that Appellees had failed to prove, by a 
preponderance of the evidence, that Appellants' residence violated the Evergreen 
CC&Rs (R. 1226), (6) it was not until after the jury rendered its verdict that Appellees 
asked the court for the first time to treat the jury as advisory and disregard the jury's 
verdict (R. 1258-1286), and (7) upon Appellees' request, the trial court entered findings 
of fact that were inconsistent with the jury's verdict (R. 1486-1487). 
Appellants likewise object to the self-serving and misleading color photograph of 
Appellants' residence which is reproduced at page 6 of Appellee's Brief. The primary 
objection to this photograph is that it is evidence. Appellees are apparently trying to 
retry this case at the appellate level. The sufficiency of the evidence to support the 
jury's verdict or the trial court's findings is not at issue in this appeal. To refer to the 
evidence presented at trial is therefore inappropriate. 
J2r 
Moreover, to refer to this particular photograph in a statement of "facts" is 
especially misleading. It is common knowledge that photographs can distort reality 
through carefully selected perspectives and by narrowing the scope of focus. However, 
rather than being lured into responding to Appellees' photographic distraction with an 
equally irrelevant essay on how photographs are not appropriate indicators of fact, it 
seems sufficient to respond with the fact that the jury traveled as a group to the 
premises in question as part of the presentation of evidence at trial, and after so doing, 
found that Appellants' residence did not violate the CC&Rs. The jury's finding was 
not based upon one carefully selected photograph but instead after having personally 
viewed Appellants' residence and Appellees' residence in complete panoramic context 
(R. 1128). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I: ROMRELL V. ZIONS FIRST NATIONAL RANK IS INAPPLICABLE 
BECAUSE THE PARTIES IN ROMRELL STIPULATED THAT THE 
CASE PROCEED ONLY AS AN EQUITY CASE WHILE THE CASE 
AT HAND ALWAYS REMAINED A MIXED CASE OF EQUITY 
AND LAW. 
Appellees Gary Goldberg and Diana Meehan ("Goldberg and Meehan") argue 
that Romrell v. Zions First National Bank NA.9 611 P.2d 392 (Utah 1980), is a 
controlling precedent in this appeal. The facts of the case at hand, however, are 
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markedly different from the facts in Romrell and, more importantly, the issues 
presented in the present case are completely different from the issues addressed in 
Romrell. Romrell is therefore inapplicable to the present case. 
In Romrell, the plaintiff sought specific performance of a contract to sell real 
estate and, alternatively, damages for breach of contract and fraud. Id. at 393. !The 
parties stipulated in a pretrial order that should plaintiff be found entitled to specific 
performance, her other claims for relief would be dismissed as moot." Id. at 393-94. 
At the conclusion of trial, ff[t]he jury was instructed that if they found an oral contract 
for the conveyance of the land in question, the contract could be enforced if there was 
sufficient part performance on the part of plaintiff or if defendants had acted in such a 
manner as to be estopped from asserting the statute of frauds." Id. at 395. The case 
was submitted to the jury on a general verdict. The jury's general verdict was as 
follows: 
We, the jury empaneled in this action, hereby find the issues 
in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendants and find 
that the plaintiff is entitled to an order directing defendants 
to convey to plaintiff the property in dispute. 
DATED this 19th day of October, 1978. 
John W. Peterson 
Foreman 
Id. at 394. 
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It is clear that Romrell was properly treated as an equity case. This is because 
the parties' stipulated that it proceed as an equity case first and then, if equitable relief 
were denied, that it proceed second as a case at law. In effect, by so stipulating, the 
parties in Romrell waived their constitutional right to have the legal issues decided first 
by the jury. 
In the case at hand, the parties did not stipulate to the equity case being 
decided first. Instead, the parties proposed jury instructions on the issues of whether 
the CC&Rs had been violated and whether damages should be awarded; in other 
words, on the legal issues of the case. The trial court so instructed the jury and the 
jury rendered a special verdict finding there was no violation of the CC&Rs. Because 
the jury found there was no violation of the CC&Rs, the jury never reached the 
question of damages. 
Another important distinction between Romrell and the case at hand is that the 
jury's verdict was followed in Romrell and the jury's verdict was rejected in the present 
case. The issue of whether or not a trial court can reject a jury's findings and enter its 
own inconsistent findings of fact in a mixed case of equity and law was not even 
addressed by Romrell. 
Yet another very important distinction between Romrell and the case at hand is 
that Romrell was decided before International Harvester Credit Corp. v. Pioneer Tractor 
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and Implement, Inc., 626 P.2d 418 (Utah 1981), and Zions First Nat'l Bank v. Rocky 
Mountain Irrigation, Inc., 795 P.2d 658 (Utah 1990). International Harvester recognized 
for the first time in the State of Utah that Utah Const. Art. I, § 10 guarantees a right 
to a jury trial in civil cases. Zions, decided nine years after International Harvester, 
expands the ruling in International Harvester to require that Vhen legal and equitable 
issues turn on the same operative facts, a jury must decide the legal issue first; the 
jury's factual determination binds the trial court in its determination of the parallel 
equitable issue." Zions, 795 P.2d at 662. The implication of International Harvester and 
Zions on the case at hand are discussed in Point II of this brief. Also discussed in 
Point II is a discussion of how Goldberg and Meehan's proposed interpretation of 
Romrell is inconsistent with International Harvester and Zions. 
In conclusion, because of the dramatic factual and procedural differences 
between Romrell and the case at hand and because of the evolution of case law after 
Romrell, the Romrell case has no application to the issues presented in this appeal. 
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POINT H: GOLDBERG AND MEEHAN'S INTERPRETATION OF ROMRELL 
WOULD MAKE ROMRELL INCONSISTENT WITH INTERNATIONAL 
HARVESTER AND ZIONS AND GOLDBERG AND MEEHAN'S 
PROPOSED APPLICATION OF ROMRELL TO THE PRESENT CASE 
WOULD VIOLATE TIMMONS' (INSTITUTIONALLY PROTECTED 
RIGHT TO A JURY TRIAL OF THE LEGAL ISSUES. 
Goldberg and Meehan assert that under Romrell, whenever an equitable remedy 
is sought as an alternative to a legal remedy, the trial court can simply disregard a 
jury's findings of fact on the legal issues and enter its own inconsistent findings of fact 
to support whatever equitable relief the court deems appropriate. Such an 
interpretation, however, is totally inconsistent with the International Harvester and Zions 
decisions. In International Harvester, as stated above, the Utah Supreme Court 
addressed for the first time whether Art. I, § 10 of the Utah Constitution guarantees a 
right to a jury trial in civil cases. Id. at 419. The plaintiff in International Harvester 
had brought a claim for amounts due under a contract. The defendants requested a 
trial by jury and the plaintiffs responded by arguing that the defendants had no 
constitutional or statutory right to a trial by jury. The trial court granted plaintiffs 
motion to strike the jury trial demand. On appeal, however, the Utah Supreme Court 
remanded for a trial by jury, holding "that the right of jury trial in civil cases is 
guaranteed by Art. I, § 10 of the Utah Constitution." Id. at 421. 
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Plaintiff apparently argued on appeal in International Harvester that the 
proceeding was equitable and therefore not triable to a jury. The Supreme Court 
rejected this argument, however, finding that the action "concerned only money 
damages" and ftwas clearly a law action." Nevertheless, the Supreme Court went on to 
state that even if the claim for damages was only incidental to a claim for equitable 
relief, "a jury trial should be accorded the parties on the issues of fact raised in a legal 
cause of action when legal relief is sought in conjunction with equitable relief." Id. at 
421. 
In deciding International Harvester, the Utah Supreme Court looked to the 
United States Supreme Court's decisions in Dairy Queen, Inc. v. Wood, 369 U.S. 469 
(1962), and Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500 (1959), which considered 
the issue of a right to a jury trial in a civil action in light of the United States 
Constitution's guarantee of the right to trial by jury on legal issues, 626 P.2d at 421 n.2. 
In Beacon, the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari because "[maintenance 
of the jury as a fact finding body is of such importance and occupies so firm a place in 
our history and jurisprudence that any seeming curtailment of the right to a jury trial 
should be scrutinized with the utmost care." Beacon, 359 U.S. at 501. The plaintiff in 
Beacon asked for an order enjoining defendant from violating antitrust laws and also 
claimed treble damages as a result of past violations. The Beacon case, therefore, is 
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factually similar to the case at hand; both cases involve claims for injunctive relief and 
for damages resulting from alleged historical violations of applicable rules. The United 
States Supreme Court noted in Beacon that the constitutional protection of the right to 
a trial by jury with respect to legal claims would in effect be violated in cases that 
involved a concurrent claim for equitable relief if the trial court were allowed to decide 
the equitable issue first and then rely upon its own findings of fact, rather than the 
jury's, to dismiss the legal action. Id. at 509-11. 
In Dairy Queen, the plaintiff likewise sought both equitable and legal relief. The 
United States Supreme Court in Dairy Queen noted that under the federal rules 
allowing consolidation of equitable and legal claims, 
attempts were made indirectly to undercut [the constitutional 
right to a jury trial in civil actions] by having federal courts 
in which cases involving both legal and equitable claims 
were filed decide the equitable claim first. The result of 
this procedure in those cases in which it was followed was 
that any issue common to both the legal and equitable 
claims was finally determined by the Court and the parties 
seeking trial by jury on the legal claim was deprived of that 
right as to these common issues. 
392 U.S. at 472. The Court thus decided in Dairy Queen as follows: 
We conclude therefore that the district judge erred in 
refusing to grant petitioner's demand for a trial by jury on 
the factual issues related to the question of whether there 
has been a breach of contract. Since these issues are 
common with those upon which respondent's claim to 
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equitable relief is based, the legal claims involved in the 
action must be determined prior to any final court 
determination of respondent's equitable claims. 
Dairy Queen, 369 U.S. at 479. 
Before moving on, it should be noted that the International Harvester case was 
decided nine months after the Romrell case. In the Court's instruction in International 
Harvester on how trial courts should proceed in cases involving both equitable and legal 
claims, the Romrell decision is not mentioned once. Instead, the Court refers back to 
the earlier decisions of Dugan v. Jones, 615 P.2d 1239 (Utah 1980), and Valley Mortuary 
v. Fairbanks, 225 P.2d 739 (Utah 1950), as controlling. This is further evidence that 
the Romrell decision was not intended to be a ruling on the issues presented by this 
appeal. 
The rule of law in International Harvester was further clarified nine years later in 
Zions. The plaintiff in Zions filed suit "to enforce notes, take possession of collateral 
under security agreements, and to foreclose mortgages." Id. at 660. The defendant 
asserted the affirmative defense that the notes had been materially and fraudulently 
altered. Id. Prior to trial, the trial court ruled that the issue of whether the notes had 
been altered was for the court to determine. Id. at 661. The Utah Supreme Court 
ruled that the trial court committed reversible error in reserving this factual 
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determination to itself. Id. at 662-63. The rationale of the Court in Zions was as 
follows: 
In International Harvester, we noted that our analysis was in 
harmony with that of the United States Supreme Court on 
the issue of the right to a jury trial in civil cases when 
equitable issues are also involved. International Harvester, 
626 P.2d at 421 n.2. In the federal courts, there is no 
question that when legal and equitable issues turn on the 
same operative facts, a jury must decide the legal issue first; 
the jury's factual determination binds the trial court in its 
determination of the parallel equitable issue. [Citations 
omitted.] We approve of this procedure. 
The trial court should have allowed the jury to decide the 
material, fraudulent alteration issue, and as to the two notes 
creating the line of credit, the Court should not have ruled 
on enforcement, the right to collateral, or foreclosure until it 
had the jury's verdict. 7/ should then have deferred to that 
verdict in making its rulings. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
The Zions decision was decided 10 years after the Romrell decision. Once again, 
it is interesting to note that the Romrell decision is not once cited in the Zions decision, 
suggesting that Romrell was never intended to be a ruling on the issues presented by 
this appeal. 
The trial judge in this case committed error in concluding that this case is an 
equity case as opposed to a mixed case containing equitable claims and legal claims. 
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Legal counsel for Goldberg and Meehan assert that Valley Mortuary, International 
Harvester and Zions are not controlling of this appeal because Goldberg and Meehan's 
legal claim for damages was intended to be as an alternative to the equitable relief 
sought when, on the other hand, Valley Mortuary, International Harvester and Zions 
involved legal claims that were asserted in addition to the equitable claims. This 
distinction made by opposing counsel is one without any relevant meaning in relation to 
this appeal and is certainly not a distinction that was made by the court in Romrell. 
Regardless of whether the legal claim is asserted as an alternative to the equitable 
claim or in addition to the equitable claim, the fact remains that when a legal claim is 
being submitted for decision, the Utah Constitution protects a party's right to a trial by 
jury not only on the legal claim but also on the underlying factual questions presented 
by such claim; that is, unless the parties waive this protection, as was the case in 
Romrell. 
As the Dugan, Valley Mortuary, International Harvester, and Zions cases hold, the 
constitutional right to a trial by jury in civil cases must be protected even in cases 
where the legal claim is incidental to an equitable claim. The only feasible way of 
protecting that right is to require that the jury not only decide the legal claim but also 
that the jury determine the factual questions underlying the legal claim. If the jury's 
determination on questions of fact has bearing upon the equitable claim, the jury's 
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finding of fact is binding and the court must defer to that finding in deciding the 
eqi lit able claim. ' . ,. ..-: •• •' .' •' . ' : • •' •;.' 
Although not expressly stated in any of the cases cited above, the policy reasons 
are clear for applying the jury's factual determinations not only to the legal issues but 
also to the Court's C * .mination of the equita" d 
to justify its ruling on an equitable issue by entering findings of fact that are 
.JUS findings on a legal issue, it would no doubt cause 
both the court and the jury to be reduced in stature in the perception of both the 
public and participants in legal proceedings. It is quite troubling to believe that two 
purposes; the jury's version being applicable to the legal issues and the judge's version 
being applicable to the equitable issues. For example, .- , T- *. <m > findings of 
fact and order were allowed to stand in the case at hr" 
inconsistent findings of fact; namely, (1) the jury's finding that Timmons did not violate 
and (2) the trial court's inconsistent finding ih:\i tfu - n i !•«*;, r the CC&Rs 
for purposes of Goldberg and Meehan ^ ^Aiin* -.-^ ajunctive relief, i h natural 
13 • 
the ruling of the jury or the ruling of the trial court would be criticized as being based 
upon the "corrupt" set of facts as opposed to the "true" set of facts. 
Moreover, if this Court were to uphold the trial court's ruling, it could lead to 
abuse. In cases where a claimant wants a trial by the court rather than a trial by jury, 
the claimant could start asserting alternative equitable claims in every possible case so 
as to undermine the adverse parties' constitutional right to a trial by jury on the legal 
issues. 
In conclusion, the trial court committed error by disregarding the jury's findings 
of fact and entering its own inconsistent findings of fact. In so doing, the trial court 
not only deprived Timmons of his constitutional right to trial by jury of the legal issues 
and underlying facts, it also failed to follow the procedure adopted in Zions; namely, it 
failed to follow the jury's findings of fact on the legal issue in its "determination of the 
parallel equitable issue." Zions, 795 P.2d at 602. 
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POINT HI: THE PARTIES D m NOT CONSENT TO THE JURY ACTING AS AN 
ADVISORY JURY. 
Goldberg and Meehan assert that Timmons consented to 
advisory jury when the following dialogue with the court occurred following the jury 
The jury returned their verdict and were discharged. 
T H E C O U R T : M righ^ G e n t l e m e n 
Mr. Winterholler, would you please prepare an 
Order/Judgment of the court consistent with tH 
verdict, 
MR. WINTERHOLLERi I will, Yor~ TTmor, 
THE COUR1: And then is there ai, 
that this court needs to do about this case? 
MR. WINTERHOLLERi You need to determine 
whether or not you independently wish to award Injunctive 
Relief and also you need to address the issue of the 
appropriateness of the ammount [sic] of fees. 
THE COURT: How did you wish to handle that? 
Why don't you, unless you really want oral argument;why 
[sic] don't you submit a memorandum and let the court 
decide at that point whether I desire some oral argument on 
that? And that would be the issue of attornie's [sic] fees 
and submit an affidavit together with your argument, that 
you're entitled to it. And then any opposition to that, and 
also your position with regard to Injunctive Relief? 
MR. STRACHAN: Very well. 
MR. WINTERHOLLER: We'll do that. 
THE COURT: And in the court's findings the court 
would need to make and how you want to handle that. 
Would you please prepare a submission to the court within 
the next ten days. 
MR. WINTERHOLLER: Yes. 
THE COURT: All right. And then give you five 
days thereafter in which to respond. 
MR. STRACHAN: That would be fine. 
THE COURT: All right. That will be the Order. 
The court will be in recess. 
(R. 1786-88). 
Taken in context, it is clear that rather than expressing consent to the jury being 
treated as an advisory jury, legal counsel for Timmons was merely following the 
procedure clearly established in Zions. In essence, Timmons, legal counsel was stating 
that the trial court still needed to make a determination, albeit merely as a formality, on 
the equitable issue even though the legal issue had been decided by the jury and the 
factual determination of the jury in reaching the legal conclusion was, in effect, 
determinative of the equitable claim. 
As the Utah Supreme Court stated in Zions: 
[W]hen legal and equitable issues turn on the same 
operative facts, a jury must decide the legal issue first; the 
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jury's factual determination binds the trial court in its 
determination of the parallel equitable issue. 
Following the procedure in Zions, Timmons' legal counsel was merely requesting that 
the trial court also order that Goldberg and Meehan's equitable claim for injunctive 
relief be denied bnsr.1 „„i " ' " ' 1 (I I, 11 ,„i, Vftfts I I ( I 
violated. 
Rathei than showing ,...;. the parties consented to the jury acting in an advisory 
capacity, the above dialogue between the trial judge and the parties' lep.al counsel, 
taken in context, instead shows that the trial court and legal counsel viewed the jury's 
legal counsel to "prepare an Order/Judgment of the court consistent with this jury's 
verdict." (emphasis added). The trial judge then asks if there is anything further that 
the court needs to do about the case. Qearlj if till s ti ial ji i ige ha ;:1 ah • z adj • decided 
that the jury was acting in an advisory capacity, he would know that he still had to 
clrdcle whr"1 i . i I'J -
 M JI i "L juij > a ' l iL' i .. '' ' • .. .:. . . . ' -.' 
In addition, if Goldberg and Meehan's legal counsel had already decided prior to 
the jury verdict that they wanted the jury treated as an advisory jury, they surely would 
have said something whei» 'hi1 jury's vf?*d"« i nu'iii *| ' "l > ' lii» iii-ni thtM' 
mention by anybody about the jury being "advisory." The record indicates that the 
concept of the jury being treated as "advisory" was an afterthought by Goldberg and 
Meehan and it was not presented to the trial court until well after the jury had 
rendered its verdict. 
CONCLUSION 
Goldberg and Meehan's legal claim for monetary damages was properly 
submitted to the jury. In fact, Timmons had a constitutional right to have Goldberg 
and Median's legal claim for damages decided by a jury. Under Zions, International 
Harvester, Dugan and Valley Mortuary, Timmons also has a right to have the jury's 
determination of facts also be binding on the court's ruling on Goldberg and Meehan's 
equitable claim. Because the jury found no breach of the CC&Rs, Goldberg and 
Meehan clearly are not entitled to any equitable relief. As a result, this case should be 
remanded with the instructions that the judgment on the jury verdict be entered and 
that Goldberg and Meehan's equitable claim be denied based upon the jury's findings 
of fact and also with the instruction that Timmons is the prevailing party in this action 
-18-
and that attorneys* fees should be awarded upon presentation ol the piool >l I  h e s a m e 
• 5 t i i a l c ::: 11 11 1: ' ' ' • ' ! '" " ' • ' • ••' ' ••' . . ': ..: • ' • 
DATED this /— day of November, 1994. 
Respci emitted, 
KIRTON & McCONKIE 
*au] H. Matthews 
Merrill F. Nelson 
Daniel V. Goodsell 
Attorneys for Defendants-Appellants 
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copies of the foregoing REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANTS was mailed by United 
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Gordon C. Strachan, Esq. 
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STRACHAN & STRACHAN 
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